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6. Reining in Provincial Fiscal ‘O w ners’: 
Decentralization in Lao PDR
Juan Luis G om ez, Jorge M artinez-Vazquez and 
Cristian Sepulveda1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The People’s Democratic Republic of Lao (Lao PDR), landlocked between 
Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, China, and Vietnam in the core of 
Southeast Asia, accounts for a population of some six million over a total 
surface o f 236,800 square kilometers. Latest estimates would place poverty 
rates at around 33 percent of households (ADB, 2002). With an estimated 
per capita income of $500 in 2006 (World Bank, 2006), Lao PDR stands 
among the poorest countries in Asia. Inequality, measured by an estimated 
Gini coefficient o f some 0.36 (UNDP, 2004) is high for such a low level of 
income.2 Lao’s set o f basic human development indicators rank the country 
133 out of 177 states in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2007).
Recent economic growth is reportedly high, with an annual average rate 
of over 6 percent between 2001 and 2006, mostly fuelled by the expansion 
o f the resource sector (IMF, 2007). Agriculture accounts for the largest 
share o f the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while mineral exports and 
investments in hydro-power have recently been the most important engines 
o f growth. Reform of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) remains allegedly 
timid and a number of measures have been recommended to encourage the 
development of a nascent private sector (World Bank, 2005).’
Despite the macroeconomic stability experienced in recent times, serious 
concerns have been raised over the country’s weak fiscal position, with 
upward pressures on the wage bill and the presence of large government 
expenditure arrears (World Bank, 2005). Lao PDR reports a ratio of 
revenues over GDP o f around 11 percent, one o f the lowest among 
developing countries (IMF, 2006). A fourth of the real growth in fiscal 
revenues over the last few years is accounted for by the expanding energy 
sector, the tax revenues o f which accure to the central government, a
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situation that contrasts with decreased revenue collections at the provincial 
level.
Success in regaining a solid fiscal footing, especially in the areas of 
improved revenue collection and conservative public service hiring policies, 
remains largely the responsibility o f  subnational levels o f  government.4 
Almost 40 percent o f all national expenditure on basic social services is 
conducted at the subnational level (World Bank, 2007), although in light of 
Lao PDR developmental needs, resources available may still not suffice to 
meet subnational expenditure needs for social services and infrastructure. In 
this chapter we make the case that structural deficiencies in the system of 
inter-governmental fiscal relations may be as important a constraint for the 
sustainable development o f the country as the overall lack of resources and 
pose substantial barriers for effective reform.
Back and Forth: A Brief History of Decentralization Patterns in 
Lao PDR
Decentralization policy has for many years played a central role in different 
Lao PDR attempts to reform its public sector (see Box 6.1 for a chronology 
of the main landmarks.) Following Vaillancourt (2001) and UNCDF (2002), 
the Lao history o f central-local relations can be divided into four well- 
defined periods and described as a recurrent pattern of decentralization and 
re-centralization. The first period, from 1975 (year of the establishment of 
the Lao PDR) to 1986 was characterized by the coexistence o f a significant 
level o f autonomy allocated to provinces, and a centrally-planned economy. 
Despite the autonomy granted, provinces were largely dependent on 
transfers from the central government during the period.
With the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, the 
autonomy enjoyed by provinces increased further. The provincial 
administration in general was endowed with most of the planning and 
budgeting responsibilities, and the provincial governors in particular with 
authority over the provincial and district tax offices (Keeulers and 
Siboungeuang, 1999). In a move that has proven to have important fiscal 
consequences, provincial governors obtained management responsibility 
over provincial civil servants, including wage and hiring policies 
(Vaillancourt, 2001). As Keeulers and Siboungeuang (1999) note, 
devolution in Lao PDR reached a point where provinces were able to set 
interest rates and exchange rates for the local currency, for a period o f time 
effectively dismantling the central state banking system.
Unsustainable fiscal imbalances and the intrinsic macroeconomic 
instability derived from this system prompted a first drive towards the re­
centralization of expenditure and revenue responsibilities in 1991, explicitly
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January 2004
Source: UN Cartographic Section
reflected in the new Constitution of 1991, and the 1994 Budget Law and 
that continued during most of the 1990s. 5
Box 6.1 A chronology o f  decentralization in Lao PDR
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1975 • Proclamation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
• Considerable independence granted to the provinces despite the 
implementation of the centralized state.
• Provinces largely dependent on transfers from the central 
government
1986 • Adoption of the New Economic Mechanism
• Accelerated fiscal and administrative devolution to the provinces.
• Provinces come under the responsibility of the Provincial 
Governor. Links with the central tax office and line Ministries are 
severed.
• Each government tier replicated the same tax instruments at each 
level.
• Provinces determined their own interest and exchange rates.
1991 • Fifth Party Congress Resolution on re-centralization
• New Constitution is approved re-stating the unitary nature of the 
state.
1992 • First consolidated National Budget is approved since 1975.
Included both central and local government expenditures.
1994 • New budget law approved.
• Established the principles of State Budget formulation.
2000 New wave of decentralization.
• Instruction 01/PM. Defined the province as the strategic unit 
(focus on planning activities) and the district as the budget 
execution unit.
• Decree 192/PM on the Implementation of the Budget Law
• Instruction 475, defined revenue sources by levels of 
government.
• Instruction 128, detailed planning responsibilities at each level of 
government.
2007 • New Budget Law. Orders the centralization of Treasury, Customs
and Tax Administration functions.
2008 • National Budget Law Implementation Decree
The fourth and last stage of the decentralization process started in the early 
2000s. The new decade witnessed initially a rebirth of the decentralization 
impetus, with the approval of Decree 01 /PM and 192/PM on the 
Implementation of the Budget Law. In particular, Decree 01/PM had the 
main objective of defining the province as the strategic unit (focus on 
planning activities) and the district as the budget execution unit 
(Vaillancourt, 2001). Both decrees are supported by Instruction
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Note/Recommendation 475, defining revenue sources by levels o f 
government, and Instruction Note/Recommendation 128, detailing planning 
responsibilities at each level of government.
Given the central importance o f the power granted to governors in the 
system, both in the diagnostic o f the problems now faced by Lao PDR in the 
area of decentralization and the options available to move the system 
forward, it is quite critical to understand why this institution (of all­
powerful governors) came about in the system in the first place and why it 
has endured over time. It would appear that a highly de-concentrated system 
run by provincial governors has roots in the war o f independence efforts,6 
and also in the fragmented geography o f the country. Some authors however 
place the origins of this institutional inertia of provincial autonomy in the 
ancient organization o f countries in district-like units called meuangs. The 
meuangs were ruled by aristocratic families that, although officially pledged 
alliance to the royalty, enjoyed considerable discretion in local affairs 
(Stuart-Fox, 2005).
On the other hand, even though many of the governors are ranking 
members of the Politburo and seem to enjoy substantial discretion in their 
operations, in more recent times they have been far from immune to central 
government action. In fact, of the cohort o f governors appointed or re­
appointed by the President at the V Party Congress of 2006, few remain in 
office by the end of their terms, with the rest being removed at different 
points allegedly for reasons having to do with provincial finances.7 But, in 
any case, the governors are accountable ultimately to the Revolutionary 
Party and not to the populations they are meant to serve.
The current system seems to respond to the ingrained belief among the 
top authorities of the country that the current arrangement is the best way to 
govern it, either because of historical developments or the geographic and 
ethnic diversity o f the country. However, as we will examine below, it is 
highly unlikely that the decentralization reform agenda of the Lao PDR will 
be able to move forward without finding a way to reign in the power and 
discretion now exercised by the provincial governors. At the same time, the 
process will require strengthening central government institutions, 
especially the Ministry o f Finance, by controlling revenue collections (the 
apparatus of tax administration and Customs) and expenditures (the 
Treasury system o f budget execution). Although it may seem a bit 
paradoxical, one of the most important lessons from the international 
experience with decentralization for the Lao PDR is that an effective system 
o f decentralized governance will require a significantly stronger central 
government in key areas of the budget process.
This assessment, shared by many international observers, seems to have 
ushered in the consideration of reforms conducive to the re-centralization of
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the critical functions o f Treasury and Tax Administration, currently under 
the control of provincial governors. This new change in the course of the 
reform of central-provincial fiscal relations has been formally sanctioned in 
a new Budget Law in place since 2007. It is early to evaluate the results of 
these recent policy developments. Although we would argue that the 
principles and direction of reform seem correct, reforms are still very much 
in the drawing board and it is unclear whether political agreement is 
widespread in the Government and Party. The continued swings in the 
direction o f reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations are a very specific 
characteristic of the decentralization process in Lao PDR. One would be 
hard-pressed to find another country where drives towards both 
decentralization and re-centralization of fiscal authority have alternated so 
widely over such a short period o f time. In the background and as origin of 
these reforms, we should consider the balancing o f political power between 
center and provinces rather than responses to the self-expressed needs of 
citizens.
BARRIERS TO DECENTRALIZATION DESIGN: A 
MODEL OF EXTREME DE-CONCENTRATION
The Current Vertical Structure of Government
The Constitution o f the People’s Democratic Republic o f Lao, in its Article 
75 (amended in 2003), states the republic is divided into four levels o f 
administration. There are currently 18 provinces,8 sub-divided in turn into 
141 districts and municipalities (of equal jurisdictional hierarchy), and
11,293 villages.9 The Law on Local Administrations defines, in its Article 
59, two levels o f budget for subnational finance, the province and the 
district. The village is defined as the basic revenue collection unit, with its 
expenditure tasks to be defined by the district.
Provinces and cities are ruled by governors, while districts are governed 
by mayors and municipalities and villages by chiefs. Importantly, there are 
no provincial legislative organs, in the way o f the locally elected 
assemblies. Provincial governors are appointed by the President upon the 
Prime Minister’s recommendation for a five year period (Article 16 Law on 
Local Administrations). The country’s multi-ethnic dimension is somewhat 
reflected in policy design, as the means of maintaining national cohesion. 
For example, the provincial governor or deputy governor is routinely a 
member of the majority ethnic group of the province.
The organizational structure o f the provincial administrations (Article 8 
o f the Law on Local Administrations), includes the provincial cabinet and
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the local, de-concentrated divisions of the line Ministries. The same 
structure is replicated at the district level. Although Article 10 o f the Law 
on Local Administrations establishes a principle of dual accountability of 
local divisions of line Ministries to the provincial administration and 
national Ministry, in practice it is the governor that exercises control over 
the provinces’ personnel.10 This practice is also sanctioned in the legislation 
since Article 14.12-14 establishes the governor’s capacity to “propose the 
appointment, transfer or removal of chiefs of districts and municipalities,” 
to “appoint the directors of the local divisions of the line ministries,” and to 
“appoint, transfer, or remove the chief and deputy chief o f the provincial or 
city cabinet.”
A Decentralized Vertical Structure of Government:
Necessary Conditions
An efficient system o f fiscal decentralization requires the existence of 
elected local councils at all levels o f  government (Bahl, 1999). Otherwise 
the self-expressed preferences o f local citizens over the mix of public goods 
and services are unlikely to be channeled into expenditure and tax policies. 
In addition, local officers must also be appointed locally and be accountable 
to the elected authorities.
States confront two main choices in the definition of their vertical 
structures of government. An alternative is to define a hierarchical structure 
where subnational governments are “creatures” of and accountable to their 
immediately higher level o f government. Conversely, a “bi-fijrcated” 
system o f government would include at least two levels o f subnational 
governments, each of them directly accountable to the central level.
In principle, either model would allow reaping the potential efficiency 
gains from a decentralized system o f government. However, hierarchical 
systems o f government may present greater challenges in the monitoring of 
subnational inter-governmental fiscal relations. A close monitoring of inter­
governmental fiscal relations is particularly important in the absence o f 
effective accountability mechanisms to control the behavior o f subnational 
authorities, and when the responsibilities of subnational governments have 
not been clearly defined. In Vietnam for instance, provinces were allocated 
in the new State Budget Law o f 2002 full responsibility over the definition 
o f  the expenditure and revenue responsibilities o f district and commune 
level governments. This has resulted in a wide array o f intra-provincial 
expenditure and revenue assignments. The lack of uniformity in the 
application of general principles for fiscal decentralization may result in 
perverse incentives for provinces to exercise excessive fiscal control over 
districts and communes. As it happens, districts and communes provide an
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important number of public services over which they would require 
adequate autonomy and funding.
It is thus important that, even if  hierarchical designs of vertical 
structures o f government are favored, the expenditure and revenue 
assignments o f each level o f  government, as well as the transfer 
mechanisms required to finance expenditures at the local level, are defined 
formally in the relevant legal documents (i.e., Budget Law, Organic Laws 
o f subnational governments, etc.)
Bi-furcated systems in turn, due to their nature, present potential 
problems o f coordination among the different levels of government. From 
that point o f view, it is especially important that the institutional 
mechanisms are in place in order to resolve administrative conflicts 
regarding expenditure and revenue raising responsibilities. Eventually, last 
resort to the highest judiciary institution (e.g. the Supreme Court) may be 
required in this type of administrative conflicts, but as mentioned, this need 
be a last resort option once all administrative conflict resolution channels 
are exhausted.
Barriers from the Current Vertical Structure of Government to 
Efficient Decentralization in Lao PDR
Conventionally, a structure o f de-concentrated government at the 
subnational level provides a good basis for evolving a fiscal system towards 
a more genuine decentralized structure. In Lao PDR, paradoxically, the 
current de-concentrated structure may represent one of the most important 
limitations to efficient decentralization.
First, in order to capitalize on the potential advantages of fiscal 
decentralization, provincial and district representative assemblies, with 
popular representation and with power to approve their respective 
subnational budgets are required. Providing autonomous legal standing to 
subnational units would not go against the unitary system o f government in 
Lao PDR, but the current structure of vertical government would not allow 
for such a reform without a significant overhaul o f the system.
Second, there needs to be a careful assessment of whether there are 
currently too many levels o f subnational administration and whether some 
o f the subnational units are too small to operate efficiently in a 
decentralized system o f governance. It would appear from the current 
vantage point that three levels o f budget determination (central, provincial 
and district) does not seem excessive for a country of Lao PDR size and 
geographic characteristics." On the issue o f size, there are perhaps real 
gains in efficiency to be realized by the consolidation of provinces or 
districts into a smaller number of jurisdictions. We must note, however, that
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the “optimal” size o f subnational units must not be considered exclusively 
along the lines of economies of scale or efficiency but also along other 
dimensions, including access of citizens to government units and eventually 
the accountability o f local officials to the residents in those communities. In 
addition, provinces may be better suited to accommodate ethnic territorial 
divisions. From that point o f view, inter-municipal or inter-provincial 
cooperation may allow access to the available economies o f scale without 
surrendering political representation. In short, the current level of 
fragmentation o f subnational governments would not seem to pose serious 
limitations to a transition towards an efficient system of fiscal 
decentralization.
Expenditure Assignments
Provincial administrations play a critical role in the current Lao vertical 
structure of government. The provincial administrations are assigned in the 
Law on Local Administration the general responsibilities to manage 
political, economic and socio-cultural affairs, and human resources; and to 
protect, preserve and utilize natural resources and the environment. 
Provinces are also entrusted to manage national and local defense and 
security and foreign affairs as assigned by the central government.
As a prior point to the discussion of expenditure assignments, it is 
important to underline the current pervasive role o f the state in the economy 
in Lao PDR, which in itself is preventing an adequate assignment of 
responsibilities to the different levels of government. The constraints here 
are twofold. First, the state still has important presence, as is the case in 
other Communist countries, in productive industries where its performance 
is generally not as efficient as the performance of the private sector, but 
nevertheless the state enterprises compete unfairly with those in the private 
sector. And second, even if the role o f the state could be limited to activities 
where its presence is required due to the lack of private interest, the 
involvement o f the Revolutionary Party and even the Army in productive 
activities complicates an efficient assignment of government 
responsibilities. There would appear to be no economic justification for the 
involvement o f the latter two institutions in the process o f service delivery 
at all (except in the area of National Defense and Disaster Management 
perhaps), let alone their role in productive activities, such as in the forestry 
sector by the Army. It is apparent that there is currently little or no 
conviction that the role of the state should be limited to creating an enabling 
environment for the development of the private sector.
Local governments in Lao PDR play an important role in the provision 
o f  government services, as they are assigned the responsibility o f delivering
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key public services such as education, health services, agriculture and 
infrastructure. The actual assignment of expenditures partially follows the 
subsidiarity principle and broadly coincides with standard principles of 
expenditure assignment.12 However, the absence of explicit expenditure 
assignments for lower levels o f government at district and village levels 
must be highlighted as an important shortcoming of the current system. The 
1994 State Budget Law leaves it to provincial governments to arrange all 
expenditure assignments with districts and villages within their territories, 
with very minor exceptions. As we discussed in the earlier subsection, this 
hierarchical approach to the vertical structure of government may 
potentially threaten the efficient and uniform application of best practices o f 
fiscal decentralization, especially in the absence o f adequate accountability 
mechanisms. Traditionally, these type o f hierarchical design, absent a 
formal statement of expenditure and revenue raising responsibilities for all 
levels of government, leads to unpredictability and instability in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations (as no consistent expenditure and revenue 
frameworks are provided for some subnational levels o f government). 
Added to the perceived lack of monitoring and enforcement capacity o f 
central and provincial administration, the potential result is a highly 
inefficient system o f inter-governmental fiscal relations, prone to corrupt 
practices and absent of any kind of political accountability.
Another important shortcoming of expenditure assignments in Lao is 
that the current assignment of expenditure responsibilities in the local 
government is vague. Importantly, the expenditure assignments fail to 
consider the multi-dimensional nature of expenditure assignments. The 
Budget Law does not distinguish either between national functions that are 
delegated for implementation to the subnational level (in a de-concentrated 
fashion) and those functions that are truly own functions o f  subnational 
levels (in a decentralized fashion). A second issue is the lack o f  clarification 
o f  expenditure assignments for concurrent or joint responsibilities, between 
central and subnational governments on the one hand, and between different 
levels o f subnational governments on the other; that is, the legislation does 
not clarify who is supposed to be responsible for what in the case o f many 
joint responsibilities (as can be seen in Table 6.1 below). A way to 
introduce clarity in the case o f shared responsibilities is to be explicit in the 
law about the distribution o f competencies for the regulation, the financing, 
and the implementation of each government function.
Ideally, this assignment o f expenditure responsibilities would be 
sanctioned in Organic Laws for Provincial and District Governments or in 
the Budget Law. However, in Lao PDR, the subnational levels o f 
government do not have separate legal status (as separate from the central 
government which embodies the State). This is an important legal limitation
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to the objective o f  effectively rationalizing the roles and responsibilities of 
the different levels of government.
In order to account for heterogeneity and the different levels of 
administrative capacity in each of the provinces and sub-provincial levels of 
government, expenditure assignments could have asymmetric below the 
provincial level, at district and village levels. However, in Lao like in other 
single-party communist regimes, the authorities have favored one-size-fits- 
all approaches to the restructuring of the government institutions.
Traditionally it is also desirable to complement explicit expenditure 
assignments with the strengthening o f institutions for intergovernmental 
dialog and coordination,, especially between central government agencies 
and the provinces.'3 However, to date there appears to exist little or no 
communication in many areas. In fact, the nature of the state in Lao PDR 
limits the options available for the implementation of these institutions of 
dialogue and conflict resolution. Single-party transition states are 
commonly developed along strongly hierarchical vertical structures o f 
power, and subnational units nearly operate as fiefdoms, whereby 
communication across sectors is rare and unstructured. A traditional 
example at the central government level is the problem posed by the 
separation of budgeting processes between the MOF (recurrent expenditure) 
and the Committee for Planning and Investment (capital expenditure 
budget). The lack of coordination between these two agencies results in 
operation and maintenance budgets that underestimate needs and are poorly 
aligned with ongoing investment efforts. The all-mighty Party cadres are 
usually, in a scenario of a lack of separation of powers, a last resort for all 
conflict resolution. This unnecessarily slows down processes that would be 
better left out to administrative coordinating committees and it inescapably 
leads to the considerable concentration of power that is currently placed 
upon the highest political organs of the Revolutionary Party.
In summary, in addition to suffering from many common problems in 
other decentralized countries related to the definition o f expenditure 
assignments (e.g. vague and informal statements, lack of definition of 
assignments for lower levels o f governments, no consideration of the multi­
faceted nature of expenditure assignments, etc.), Lao PDR presents other 
challenges particular to single-party communist states. Among the latter, the 
services and roles played in the economic arena by the Revolutionary Party 
and the Army rank as top limitations towards a modem definition of 
government and an efficient assignment of functions across government 
levels.
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INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS: THE HOLLOWING-OUT OF 
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
In the previous section we argued that the government of Lao PDR is not 
truly decentralized because no effective autonomy has been devolved to the 
communities. Whatever decisions are made at the subnational level, they are 
unlikely to incorporate the voice o f  residents; in particular, the communities 
are not able to elect their own representatives. In this context the 
subnational authorities are not really accountable to their constituents, and 
therefore the system would hardly be able to generate gains in efficiency 
due to a better fit o f the preferences o f the community. This argument 
suggests that the lack o f real decentralization is mainly (but not exclusively) 
associated with the expenditure side of the budget.
In this section we explain how the system has evolved into an 
exaggerated de-concentrated fiscal structure where the center currently 
lacks the ability to collect enough revenues and coordinate nationwide 
expenditure policies. Although the de-concentrated scheme can be observed 
in both the expenditure and the revenue side o f the budget, it is in the latter 
where we find the most extreme features, posing the most serious obstacles 
to moving forward with the decentralization process. In particular, our focus 
is on the problems associated with revenue collections by the provincial tax 
administration and customs.
The Assignment of Revenues and Administrative Functions
As we remarked already above, an advanced level o f de-concentration in the 
public sector is usually considered as a positive foundation for a process of 
fiscal decentralization because it is supposed to develop the administrative 
and technical capabilities o f subnational governments, and thus facilitates 
the transfer o f new expenditure and revenue responsibilities (Bahl and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2006). However, there are exceptions to that generally 
accepted rule, and Lao PDR is an important one. The high degree o f de­
concentration in Lao is one o f the main problems to be addressed in moving 
forward to decentralize the current system o f intergovernmental fiscal 
relations.
Several concerns about the inappropriate assignment of revenues and 
organization of tax administration have been raised in numerous studies and 
also by multilateral agencies (Vaillancourt, 2001; and IMF, 2006). There 
seems to be a widespread agreement about the need to strengthen the 
authority o f the Ministry of Finance by recentralizing the tax and customs 
administration.14 However, there are additional factors slowing down the 
reform process. Some of these factors, related to the structure of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, will be addressed in the foil-
Table 6.1 Assignment o f  Expenditure Responsibility in LAO PDR
C entral G overnm ent Provinces and C ities D istricts and M unicipalities V illages
Health National health and 
disease prevention 
programs
Provincial and district 
hospitals services
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
Implementation unit
Education National program 
Educational instruments
Provincial services 
Primary and secondary 
program
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
Implementation unit 
(school construction, 
and assignment of 
teacher)
Economic Activities Services managed 
centrally
Provincial and district 
services
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
Implementation unit
Culture and Sports International and state 
level movement and 
performances
Sports and cultural 
performances at local levels
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
Implementation unit
Social National programs 
State Pension programs
Provincial and district 
services
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
Implementation unit
Defense National defense Local defense and security District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
Implementation unit
Police and Security National police and 
official forces
Provincial and district police 
and security
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
Implementation unit
Political Organs National party and central 
level agencies
Provincial and district 
political organs
District and Municipal political 
organs
Implementation unit
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Table 6 .1 Assignment o f  Expenditure Responsibility in LAO PDR (continued)
C entral G overnm ent P rovinces and C ities D istricts and M unicipalities V illages
Prices Subsidies Central programs Provincial and district 
services and programs
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
n/a
interest Overseas and national 
debt service
Debt services on programs 
that benefited Provincial and 
district levels
n/a n/a
Other Expenditure Disaster, disease and 
poverty relief
Disaster, disease and 
poverty relief
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
n/a
Capital expenditures Centrally managed 
Infrastructure projects
Provincial and district 
infrastructure management
District and Municipal 
infrastructure as assigned by 
provincial government
Implementation unit
T ransfers Transfer to subnational 
governments
Transfer to Provincial and 
district and municipalities
District and Municipal services as 
assigned by provincial government
n/a
Source: Martinez-Vazquez, Gomez and Yao (2005), compiled from Decree 192/PM (Prime Minister decree on the implementation of the 1994 Budget Law)
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owing discussion, while other institutional and political factors are 
discussed in the last section of this chapter.
Provincial governments in Lao are assigned some sources of own 
revenues that roughly meet the best international practices. However, 
provincial governments are also responsible for administering and 
collecting some taxes assigned to the central government, notably those 
defined as shared revenues with the local governments, like the turnover or 
value-added tax, excise taxes and the corporate profit taxes.15 These sources 
o f revenues represent around 30 percent of total revenues at the local and 
central levels (see Table 6.2). Additionally, provincial governments are in 
charge of collecting all import duties, the natural resource tax, and the 
timber royalties. In total, around the 60 percent o f overall government 
revenue are collected at the subnational level, while a relatively weak 
central government tax administration focuses almost exclusively on the 
group of large taxpayers. Indeed, out o f a total 1,180 employees for the 
entire tax administration in the country in 2006, only 43 were located at 
headquarters (World Bank, 2007).
The performance of the tax administration is limited also by the absence 
o f  modern administrative procedures and updated technological 
improvements, as well as by the low technical capacity and expertise of its 
personnel. The resultant lack of capacity for the monitoring and 
enforcement of tax regulations leads to opaque practices that may likely 
increase the costs o f compliance and reduce tax collections. In this context 
it is not surprising that the overall tax revenue performance o f the tax 
administration is very low. It has been estimated that the central and 
provincial tax departments currently collect only around 30 percent of all 
revenues that could have been collected (Martinez-Vazquez, Gomez and 
Yao, 2006). What complicates matters further is that the assignment of 
administrative responsibilities over revenue collections is in practice 
defined in accordance to the type or location o f the taxpayers not to the 
different tax instruments. The same tax instrument can therefore be assigned 
to different levels o f  government, adding complexity in the system and 
reducing the potential gains from economies of scale in tax administration.
The Power of Provincial Administrations and the Distortion of 
Incentives for Revenue Mobilization
Many of the problems associated with the collections of government 
revenues in Lao PDR are associated with the excessive power embodied in 
provincial administrations and particularly on the governors. In the context 
o f the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) introduced in 1986 the provinces 
were given a great deal o f authority regarding the collection of
2
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Table 6.2 Composition o f  Local and Central Revenues, period 2004-2005
Local own-revenues: Central own-revenues: Total
Revenues
(Million
Kip)
Share on 
local 
revenues 
(%)
Revenues
(Million
Kip)
Share on 
local 
revenues
(%)
Revenues
(Million
Kip)
Share on 
local 
revenues (%)
Income taxes 228,307 23.1 67,553 2.4
Other fees 109,621 11.1 Turnover taxes 
(collected by Customs)
490,231 17.8
Natural resource 
duties
79,373 8.0 Import duties 444,350 16.1
Royalties 42,797 4.3 Overflight fees 221,763 8.0
Fees 37,545 3.8 Timber royalties 212,131 7.7
Land tax 27,618 2.8 Amortization 
Excise tax
(collected by Customs)
130,015
124,714
4.7
4.5
Others 125,459 12.7 Others 308,927 11.2
Total local 
own-revenues 650,720
65.8 Total central own-revenues
1.999,684 72.5 2,650,404 70.7
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Table 6.2 Composition o f  Local and Central Revenues, period 2004-2005(continued)
Shared revenues:
Revenues
(Million
Kip)
Share on 
local 
revenues
(%)
Revenues
(Million
Kip)
Share on 
local 
revenues
(%)
Revenues
(Million
Kip)
Share on 
local 
revenues (%)
Turnover tax-Tax 
Department
180,223 18.2 161,342 5.8 341,565 9.1
Profit taxes 131,278 13.3 196,011 7.1 327,289 8.7
Excise-Tax
Department
13,685 1.4 226,211 8.2 239,896 6.4
Revenue on 
SOEs dividend
5,394 0.5 171,953 6.2 177,347 4.7
Minimum tax 8,092 0.8 4,072 0.1 12,164 0.3
Total local 
shared-revenues
338,672 34.2 Total central 
shared-revenues
759,589 27.5 1,098,261 29.3
Total revenues 489,392 100.0 2,759,273 100.0 3,748.666 100.0
Source: Ministry o f Finance, Lao PDR
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revenues, including those o f  the central government, and were even allowed 
to set the interest rates and exchange rates at the provincial branches of the 
State Bank. This atypical arrangement, which has been only partially 
corrected, has the potential o f severely complicating the macroeconomic 
and monetary policies at the national level, and provides poor incentives to 
the financial administration of the provinces.
Under the current system, the central government defines revenue 
targets and expenditure limits for each province. In theory, the excess of 
revenue collections (over the targets) are supposed to be transferred to the 
center. In the case the revenue targets are not reached, the transfers to the 
central governments are still expected to be made, while the adjustment 
should be done solely in the level o f provincial expenditures. In practice, 
however, these rules are not applied, and collections under the target only 
imply a reduction of the transfers to the center, exactly the opposite of what 
the law prescribes. Moreover, if actual collections are higher than the target, 
a 50 percent of the excess can be kept in the province to finance capital 
expenditures.
Although this set o f rules is clearly conceived to impose budgetary 
discipline and encourage revenue collections, its actual effects might be 
very different. On the one hand, the expenditure limitations are not credible 
constraints and can potentially be manipulated by the central government in 
order to maximize its own revenues. On the other hand, increasing 
revenuecollections locally is less attractive when the gains must be shared 
with the central government. And even worse, given the weak tax 
administration at the central level, a very rational alternative for the 
provincial administrations consists simply in declaring fewer revenues 
formally and shift some to extra-budgetary accounts or let domestic-local 
companies pay less in central taxes. All these seem to have been common 
practices among subnational governments.
As an attempt to overcome these shortcomings the Instruction 2372 of 
the Ministry o f Finance, issued in 2005, established a fee-based bonus 
system for revenue collections that awards local authorities and line 
ministries with a 0.7 percent o f the total amount of custom revenues and a 
1.5 percent of the amount collected from state properties, land tax and 
certain fees. This type of solution, however, has not been effective in 
solving the revenue problem and correcting the structural deficiencies of the 
system.
The setting o f expenditure limits and revenue targets is supposed to 
follow transparent and simple methodologies based on historical 
performance and subject to marginal adjustments due to changes in policies 
and regulations. But again, the actual practice differs from the original 
intention o f the Law. Both the expenditure limits and revenue targets are not
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necessarily set with strict attention to the technical criteria but rather 
defined in a bargaining process between the central government and the 
provincial authorities during the budget elaboration.
The political unwritten aspects o f  the budgetary process have been 
routinely exacerbated by mutual allegations. While the central government 
is accused o f underestimating subnational expenditure needs and setting 
unrealistic revenue targets, the subnational authorities are accused of 
concealing revenue collections and overestimating their expenditure needs.
From an institutional point of view, economic management agencies of 
the State suffer strong pressure to show significant growth in a series of 
“national-importance” indicators, such as GDP and revenue growth. Absent 
substantial changes to the tax system, budget planning is left to inaccurate 
estimates of economic growth and the tax base to justify the desired 
increases in revenue growth (World Bank, 2007). Subsequently, the 
unrealistic revenue estimates provide the platform for non-sustainable 
expenditure patterns.
There may be yet another perverse incentive for the definition of 
unrealistic revenue targets. It is assumed that provinces report only a 
fraction of the revenues collected on behalf of the central government. 
Higher revenue targets may have been thought to provide a stimulus to 
improved disclosure o f collection, but the lack of capacity to enforce 
sanctions (in the form of obligatory lower expenditure if  revenue targets are 
not met) water down the debatable strength of this incentive. In fact, even 
though the subnational governments are supposed to deposit the collection 
o f fees in the provincial governments’ treasury accounts, this requirement is 
not always met and a portion of the collections are deviated to alternative 
accounts and sometimes simply “lost” and never reported.
In any case, the bargaining power of the provinces is substantial, and 
depends not only on the fact that they control an important share of the 
central government revenues, but also on the legal provisions defined by the 
Law on Local Administration. In its Article 14, paragraphs 12-14, the 
governor is granted with an important degree of discretion in appointing and 
removing most of the positions at the subnational level, including those of 
de-concentrated national agencies like tax administration and the Treasury. 
The provincial administration is also paying the salaries o f all public 
servants, thus in practice the governor can exercise firm control over the 
central government personnel in the province.
The Consequences of the Excessive Revenue De-concentration
Given the natural asymmetries in the ability to collect revenues, the lack of 
centralized coordination and control can be expected to exacerbate
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inequalities among subnational governments. Vientiane municipality, for 
instance, collects much more revenues than the rest of the provinces, and in 
general a great variation in revenue collections can be observed at this level 
o f government. Another factor contributing to fiscal inequalities is the 
subnational collection o f central revenues whose derivation is erratically 
distributed across the country, like the import duties, which in practice can 
be retained only by those provinces where the collection takes place.
These inequalities are difficult to reverse. But more importantly, the 
current system does not provide the mechanisms to ensure an equitable and 
efficient allocation of the available resources. As explained, the use of 
expenditure limits and revenue targets -which are also the foundations of 
the main program of intergovernmental transfers in Lao PDR, is not 
working properly. This system has led to the non transparent and 
unpredictable financing o f all levels o f government and it does not provide a 
sound rationale for the distribution o f available resources. In short, the 
current system is not properly addressing the vertical and horizontal 
inequalities associated with the existence o f certain degree o f autonomy at 
the subnational level.
This outcome is partly the result o f a poorly designed system o f the 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, but it might also be understood as an 
endogenous factor imposing perverse incentives to the government 
authorities at every level. For instance, even though the subnational 
administrations are, legally speaking, mere de-concentrated governmental 
units without autonomous legal standing, the lack of adequate control 
mechanisms implies that they are not truly accountable to the center. Since 
the system is virtually disassembled and unable to ensure fairness or 
efficiency gains to all participants, then every actor is virtually compelled to 
extract selfishly all the benefits that can possibly obtain from it.
As explained before, there is a widespread agreement about the need of 
re-centralizing some key dimensions of the fiscal management, mainly 
through the strengthening of the Ministry o f Finance and in particular the 
Treasury function. But so far the reforms have been slow and have not lead 
to a sound structure in intergovernmental fiscal relations. A strong central 
government with the ability to monitor and evaluate the progress of the 
several components o f the system is a necessary condition for the 
implementation of a sound fiscal decentralization reform (Bahl, 1999).
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POLITICAL BARRIERS: THE CHALLENGES OF SINGLE 
PARTY SYSTEM S
With the new constitution of 1991, a unicameral National Assembly 
composed o f 115 representatives was created in Lao PDR. The members to 
the Assembly are elected for a period of five years from a list prepared by 
the People’s Revolutionary Party. In recent years, “properly screened” 
independents have been allowed to run for the Assembly; however, in the 
last election of 2006, only two o f the delegates elected were classified as 
independents (CIA 2008). The National Assembly has been criticized for 
representing little more than a legislative “rubber-stamp” institution that 
sanctions the political proposals channeled from the party and through the 
executive. The overlap between the Party and the Army is also substantial, 
with six out o f the 11 members o f the Politburo (the highest political organ 
within the Party) being current or former members of the Army.
The reform of the current structure of central-provincial fiscal relations 
will thus face significant barriers due to the political “status-quo”. In order 
to move towards sound fiscal decentralization arrangements, the extensive 
fiscal powers o f Provincial Governors would have to be vested upon a 
provincial legislative body elected by citizens. This would ensure the proper 
accountability o f Provincial Governments and the matching o f  expenditure 
decisions to local preferences. One would expect arduous resistance on the 
part o f the powerful group of Governors to a change of this kind. The power 
and autonomy given to the Governors has allowed them to develop relations 
o f patronage with the local elites in the historical Laotian way, reinforcing 
what may resemble some sort o f a political constituency. Institutional 
resistance should also be expected from the Revolutionary Party, as any 
move towards further decentralization that does not include the 
implementation o f  elected councils would extend its power. Currently, local 
representatives are Party members and represent the interests of the Party, 
not necessarily o f  their supposed local constituencies. Thus, the required 
political link allowing the preferences o f citizens to be reflected in 
expenditure decisions via the accountability of their representatives has 
been absent.
Moreover, the Central Government capacity to directly appoint 
Governors -  capacity, it can be assumed, adequately sanctioned by the 
Revolutionary Party -  accords an element of political control to the 
President and the Party that may not be easily surrendered. Similarly, heads 
o f the district administrations are appointed by the Provincial Governors, 
again endowing them with an important instrument of control o f sub­
provincial units of government. The transition experience of Vietnam, 
highly regarded in Lao as a critical reference, may however allow
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considering the creation of representative institutions at the subnational 
level. In Vietnam, Provincial People’s Councils directly elected by the 
population are increasingly important in the determination o f subnational 
fiscal structures.
The overlap between the Party and the Executive, and the Party and the 
Army are considerable, and usually the highest ranking bureaucrats and 
politicians are also serving or former army officers. The ranks are filled 
with veterans from the Revolutionary struggle that brought the Party to 
power and who view any kind of reform that may limit the power of the 
Party and the Army with extreme reticence (Stuart-Fox, 2005). From that 
perspective, the restructuring o f central-provincial fiscal relations, including 
the re-allocation of sources of revenue to the central level or the proposed 
increased monitoring capacity required for the Ministry o f Finance would 
alter very substantially the current balance of power.
This re-organization of intergovernmental relations along the best 
practices of fiscal decentralization would also pose a significant threat to the 
control of state-owned enterprises by the Party and the Army. The presence 
o f  the latter is particularly important in the forestry sector, including the 
exploitation of timber and related industries. These state owned enterprises, 
as it is the case in other Revolutionary regimes and in particular in the 
neighboring Vietnam, have traditionally represented a significant source of 
income for the Army. The re-assignment of revenues to a central tax office 
would directly impinge upon the freedom with which the Army has 
managed these industries. On the other hand, efficiency gains and improved 
control o f funds may be obtained from assigning qualified tax officials to 
the supervision and taxation o f those industries. But, of course, the central 
tax office may be subject to political pressures as well.
The successful reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations will require 
a political champion that leads the debate and maintains it at the forefront of 
the development topics. It is far from clear at the present time who that 
champion may be. To a certain extent, multiparty systems allow for a 
greater multiplicity o f positions and the emergence of leaders in different 
political areas. Within a single party system, however, being labeled as a 
"reformist” without having ensured sufficient political backing may be the 
more direct ticket to political oblivion. There are no alternative political 
outlets in single-party systems. No “exit” options in Hirschman’s (1970) 
terminology. Thus, altering the political equilibrium typically require long 
processes o f  debate, external events that open political windows o f 
opportunity, and extreme political valor to advocate for reform. Under these 
conditions, the emergence of political decentralization champions is made 
more unlikely. However, the current political leadership may be open to the 
“testing” of some reforms on a piloting basis, similar to the approach that
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China has quite successfully adopted for now several decades. But a strong 
case needs to be made that those reforms can bring substantial benefits to 
Lao. That case is being built if ever so slowly by the interaction of the 
international donor community and upper echelon bureaucrats at the 
Ministry of Finance. As social demands for further democratization mount, 
as has been the case in China and Vietnam, the party will need to consider 
avenues for political participation that allow channeling citizen’s demands, 
either in the form o f non-governmental organizations or some form of local 
elections.
Grassroots participation and demands for devolution is another element 
o f the political process that could bring decentralization reform. Local 
participation, either directly channeled through elections or via the work of 
civil society, is an important counter balance to the state that increases the 
accountability o f  government. However, there are presently substantial 
barriers to this process taking hold. In Lao PDR the operations of non­
governmental organizations so prevalent in western countries are not 
allowed, and the existing grassroots organizations are mostly satellite 
organizations of the Revolutionary Party.
Some observers have also pointed to certain cultural traits of the Laotian 
society which may allow the perpetuation of an obviously unbalanced 
system of representation in which the interests of the population at large are 
subject to the designs of the Revolutionary Party and by extension, the 
Provincial Governors. These observers have argued that the Buddhist 
predominant culture in Lao, which focuses on human spiritual development 
in contrast to materialistic achievements, fosters a certain alienation o f the 
population of Lao PDR from the political process and the practices o f its 
rulers. Aware of the formidable challenges to the development o f the 
country, and in particular of the constraints the current de-concentrated 
structure of government poses to fiscal reforms, Buddhists’ beliefs may 
quiet the demands for long-awaited reforms.
CONCLUSIONS
Lao PDR is a small poor country but with significant cultural and ethnic 
diversity and a large and inefficient public sector. Lo and behold, the 
potential for sustained economic development lies on larger investments in 
human capital, via social service expenditures in education and health, and 
physical infrastructure. Against this background, Lao confronts a tight fiscal 
resources envelope that underlines the need to improve the efficiency of 
both public expenditure and revenue collection. Fiscal decentralization
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reform has the potential of improving the overall efficiency o f the public 
sector and to allow the country to advance on the path of sustained growth.
In many important ways, the central government in Lao is fiscally too 
weak to command the resources and institutional leadership required to 
foster decentralization reforms. From the revenue side, the tax 
administration and customs service remain largely under the control o f the 
provincial governments, and from the expenditure side, the central 
government authorities lack the means, such as a centralized Treasury 
function, to control actual disbursements at any level.
Addressing the reform o f the current system o f inter-governmental fiscal 
relations in Lao PDR demands a clear and well-sequenced medium-term 
government strategy and implementation plan that is widely agreed and 
supported by the political establishment, and championed by the highest 
political leaders. Any future shorter term (or stop gap) measures would have 
to be consistent with the reform outlined in this medium-term strategy.
Importantly, the strategy would require a refinement and clarification of 
the current assignments o f expenditure responsibilities, and the definition 
and quantification of budget expenditure norms that provide an adequate 
system o f estimation of expenditure needs at subnational levels of 
government. Additionally, the centralization of the Treasury system, already 
in process o f evaluation, is a critical piece in the strategy to accord the 
central government the monitoring and enforcement capacity it requires to 
lead an efficient process o f fiscal decentralization. Also, a fine tuning of tax 
assignments along economic efficiency lines is required to allow improving 
the accountability and fiscal responsibility o f all levels o f government. 
Along those lines, the re-centralization of the tax administration would 
assist critically in endowing the central government with the fiscal prowess 
required to re-structure the financing system o f local governments. That 
would include the implementation o f transfer mechanisms that do not rely 
on faulty collection incentives, but on an adequate definition on expenditure 
needs and fiscal capacities.
However, the current institutional setup, which displays an extreme 
degree of inefficient de-concentration and a lack of democratic institutions 
that ensure public accountability, make the chances for successful 
decentralization reform pretty slim. The political and institutional forces 
that were behind the design of the current system largely remain in place. 
As with any other single-party state, the rigid control of the political thought 
by the ruling elite limits the consideration of alternatives for the vertical 
structure of government that increase the political accountability of 
subnational government representatives. It is difficult to envision in the 
short-term the rising of a champion for decentralization reform. However, 
economic pressures and the need to develop may lead the current regime to
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experiment with some forms of fiscal decentralization reforms. There is 
significant interest within the government to imitate to certain extent the 
successful reforms that have taken hold in neighboring Vietnam. This and 
the nudging forward o f the international donor community may still produce 
some significant progress in the immediate horizon.
NOTES
1. We are thankful to Balakrishna Menon for helpful comments on an earlier version of the 
chapter.
2. The Gini value is similar of that of India for example, and higher than the rate reported by 
Indonesia (UNDP, 2008).
3. Vietnam’s experience with its 2000 Enterprise Law, which significantly simplified 
enterprise registration procedures, is being held as a best practice in the region and a model 
o f reference for initiatives in this area for Lao PDR.
4. As explained further below, the vertical system o f governance in Lao PDR should more 
properly be designated as a de-concentrated system, as opposed to a decentralized system. 
Similarly, using the term "subnational levels o f government" may be misleading as the 
territorial units arc integral (de-concentrated) parts of the central government, without 
separate legal standing. However, because of the current high degree of de-concentration, 
especially decision-making autonomy, these territorial units will be loosely referred to in 
this report as subnational governments and the entire system as the decentralization system.
5. See UNCDF (2002) for further discussion.
6. Similar patterns of geographical self-sufficiency develop during Mao’s long march in China 
or Vietnam’s war of independence.
7. There are other signs that the provincial governors' power can be reigned in. For example, 
the Ministry o f Finance holds the power to issue orders to correct governors’ fiscal policies. 
However, the enforcement o f this authority seems to be more the problem, as governors are 
granted also ministerial rank.
8. This includes one prefecture (Vientiane, the capital city) and one special zone (Saysomboun, 
Special zone)
9. Although it is not accorded official recognition, districts group villages for administrative 
purposes into zones or "khcts" (UNCDF, 2002). There are other administrative units without 
separate budgetary standing; these are 4 Urban Development Administrative Authorities 
(UDAAs) and the Vientiane UDAA (VUDAA).
10. The principle o f “dual subordination" of subnational public personnel is a characteristic trait 
of the Soviet budgeting system. Although a priori it appears to be convenient, in practice 
dual subordination has failed to work well in many other countries that in the past have used 
or today continue to use a Soviet budgeting approach. The main reason is that both 
theoretically and in practice it is not possible for public employees to respond to two 
different bosses. When there is conflict of interest between the two bosses, as there always is 
in any public administration, public employees by force have to respond to only one of 
them. Other institutions and incentives, such as physical proximity or who ultimately 
appoints and fires and who pays for salaries and other benefits determine which authority 
actually controls subnational employees.
11. In addition, it would not make much sense to eliminate either the provinces or the districts 
for historical and all sorts of practical reasons.
12. The subsidiarity principle stipulates that the responsibility for the provision of goods and 
services should be placed at the lowest level o f government, (i.e., compatible with the 
smallest benefit area of the service), that is able to deliver the good or service in an efficient 
manner.
13. Even with an explicit and clear statement o f expenditure responsibilities, it is generally 
impossible to make provisions, in the law, for all possible situations encountered in delivery
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of services. Rather than introducing more and more details and complexities in the law, one 
effective way to deal with these additional uncertainties is to create or strengthen institutions 
of coordination among agencies at different levels o f government that share a particular 
expenditure responsibility. For example, holding regular meetings and providing 
information at all levels facilitates coordination for clarifying an effective assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities.
14. See, for instance, Martinez-Vazquez, Gomez and Yao (2005); and World Bank (2007, 
2008).
15. Article 16 of the National Budget Law Implementing Decree, February 2008.
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